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Abstract
Targeted attacks against network infrastructure are no-
toriously difficult to guard against. In the case of com-
munication networks, such attacks can leave users vul-
nerable to censorship and surveillance, even when cryp-
tography is used. Much of the existing work on network
fault-tolerance focuses on random faults and does not
apply to adversarial faults (attacks). Centralized net-
works have single points of failure by definition, leading
to a growing popularity in decentralized architectures
and protocols for greater fault-tolerance. However, cen-
tralized network structure can arise even when protocols
are decentralized. Despite their decentralized protocols,
the Internet and World-Wide Web have been shown
both theoretically and historically to be highly suscep-
tible to attack, in part due to emergent structural cen-
tralization. When single points of failure exist, they are
potentially vulnerable to non-technological (i.e., coer-
cive) attacks, suggesting the importance of a structural
approach to attack-tolerance. We show how the as-
sumption of partial trust transitivity, while more realis-
tic than the assumption underlying webs of trust, can be
used to quantify the effective redundancy of a network
as a function of trust transitivity. We also prove that
the effective redundancy of the wrap-around butterfly
topology increases exponentially with trust transitivity
and describe a novel concurrent multipath routing algo-
rithm for constructing paths to utilize that redundancy.
When portions of network structure can be dictated our
results can be used to create scalable, attack-tolerant in-
frastructures. More generally, our results provide a the-
oretical formalism for evaluating the effects of network
structure on adversarial fault-tolerance.
Keywords: Butterfly Topology, Fault Tolerance, Ad-
versarial Faults, Multipath Routing, Censorship, Decen-
tralization.
1 Introduction
The Net interprets censorship as damage and
routes around it.
–John Gilmore [15]
Much of the world’s infrastructure is networked:
power grids, cellular networks, roads, and of course, the
Internet. As with any critical infrastructure, the cost
of failures can be immense, so methods for tolerating
various kind of faults within networks are an important
and ongoing area of research [46, 1, 40]. Adversarial
faults, those in which an adversary can target attacks
strategically, deserve special attention. Such attacks are
both extremely difficult to guard against and often have
important social implications. In particular, censorship
and surveillance are often achieved by targeting cen-
tral network locations and either blocking or capturing
the information flowing through them. The Internet’s
decentralized design was motivated by the need to with-
stand targeted attacks, such as nuclear strikes [6]. But
despite longstanding common wisdom [15], both theo-
retical results and recent events (described below) have
demonstrated that the Internet can be surprisingly vul-
nerable to attack. Decentralization remains a promis-
ing approach towards building resilient networks, but
there is a need to better understand the relationship
between decentralized network structure and adversar-
ial fault tolerance.
The Internet’s vulnerability to censorship and other
targeted attacks has been demonstrated by several re-
cent events. In 2008, YouTube suffered a worldwide out-
age for several hours when a service provider in Pakistan
advertised false routing information [19]. The action
(known as a black hole attack) was intended to censor
YouTube within Pakistan only, but resulted in a world-
wide cascading failure. The action was initiated by gov-
ernment order in Pakistan, and spread beyond Pakistan
when a router misconfiguration allowed the false rout-
ing information to propagate globally. While the gov-
ernment order and router misconfiguration initiated the
outage, it was the structure of the Internet’s router net-
work that allowed a fault in a single router to propagate
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globally. And while the action was not an intentional
attack against the global Internet, the ability of an at-
tacker to succeed without even trying only highlights
the Internet’s vulnerability to adversarial faults.
In 2013, the Texas-based email provider Lavabit was
ordered to disclose their private SSL keys to the FBI
[36]. Rather than complying, Lavabit ceased operations
in order to protect their users from surveillance. Once
again, the attack was successful due to a highly cen-
tralized architecture: SSL keys under control of a single
entity, in a single legal jurisdiction. While originally in-
tended as surveillance, this action effectively became an
act of censorship. It is also important to note that while
Lavabit’s cryptography worked as intended, the attack
was still successful because the system was vulnerable
to non-technical coercion. So we see that such vulner-
abilities are not limited to any one system or protocol,
but result from centralized structure itself.
Analysis of the Internet’s router network has shown
that while it is remarkably resilient against random
faults, it is highly susceptible to adversarial faults [1].
These results have been attributed to the scale-free
structure of the Internet’s router network [4, 5]. In
scale-free networks and other networks with heavy-tail
degree distributions, random failures are highly likely
to affect only low-degree nodes, thus having little ef-
fect. However, Adversarial faults target the few high-
degree nodes, and therefore remove a large number of
edges with each fault. So while the protocols of the In-
ternet are decentralized, the network structure is some-
what centralized. In other words, the protocols of the
Internet do not require centralization, but centralization
may still emerge from the sociotechnical processes that
create its network structure.
With strong theoretical and historical evidence that
centralized network structure can create vulnerabilities,
methods for analyzing structural vulnerabilities and for
designing fault-tolerant networks are needed. This pa-
per presents several contributions towards advancing
those goals. While our motivation comes from the In-
ternet router network and World Wide Web, our work
is theoretical, focusing on abstract networks, and could
potentially be applied to many different types of net-
works, whether made of physical wires, virtual tunnels,
or other types of links.
We consider a setting in which a source node (Al-
ice) in a network attempts to route a message to a tar-
get node (Bob) by forwarding it through the links of
the network. A “link” in this context could represent
any kind of connection (e.g., physical cables, encrypted
channels). We assume that some nodes in the network
may be compromised by an attacker (Mal). We also
assume that Mal is an adversary of Alice specifically
and targets nodes strategically with the goal of interfer-
ing with Alice’s communications (rather than disrupt-
ing the network as a whole). This assumption applies to
scalable network architectures that can be made large
enough that an attacker must focus their resources in
order to have a significant effect. Compromised nodes
may behave incorrectly by blocking, altering, or incor-
rectly routing messages. We assume that Mal has full
knowledge of the network structure, but has limited re-
sources and thus can only compromise a fixed number
of nodes.
We also assume that nodes trust their immediate
neighbors. So Mal is unable to compromise Alice’s node,
or her direct neighbors. In the commonly used web
of trust approach [45, 16], we would extend that trust
transitively to the entire network. However, we make
a weaker and more realistic assumption: that trust is
extended transitively to nodes within a fixed number of
hops. So only the beginning and end of a path between
Alice and Bob is trusted against interference from Mal.
We call this assumption partial trust transitivity, and
refer to such paths as partially trusted.
Under the above assumptions, we show how to eval-
uate the influence of network structure on attack-
tolerance, how to use local trust and redundancy to
achieve greater attack-tolerance when no single path is
fully trusted, and propose a novel routing algorithm for
constructing such paths on the butterfly network topol-
ogy. The butterfly topology is popular in parallel pro-
cessing [26] and peer-to-peer [31, 25] applications, due
to its regular structure, low degree, and high connectiv-
ity.
It is important to note that the butterfly is a highly
structured and constrained network topology, very dif-
ferent form those found in social networks and other self-
organized networks. The reader may wonder whether it
is realistic or useful to assume such control over the net-
work structure. We have already seen that whenever a
single point of failure exists in the network, there is a
potential for an attacker to exploit it through coercion,
without needing to compromise the technology. So,
attack-tolerance cannot be achieved without the ability to
influence network structure. Luckily, there are scenarios
in which network topology can be dictated. Examples
include overlay networks [31, 25], formal organizations
[33], government-regulated cellular networks [42], and
call tree notification systems [35]. In general, when the
need for attack-tolerance is high enough to warrant in-
vestment in infrastructure, networks can be engineered
and maintained as infrastructure. It is also worth noting
that attack-tolerant networks may be sub-components
of larger, less-constrained systems. For example, a sin-
gle server might be replaced by a distributed network of
servers, each with different ownership, physical location,
and legal jurisdiction, without placing any unrealistic
constraints on the clients connecting to those servers.
Additionally, there may be ways to achieve improved
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attack-tolerance from architectures more flexible than
the butterfly, which is a potential area for future work.
We begin by describing how fault tolerance techniques
can be adapted and evaluated in a network setting
with partial trust transitivity and adversarial faults.
Generally, faults in network paths can be correlated,
preventing the application of standard fault tolerance
techniques [3, 41], which assume independent faults.
By constructing independent paths, which have no un-
trusted nodes in common, we show how to model com-
munication across a complex network in the presence of
correlated adversarial faults as communication across
redundant simple channels with random errors. Redun-
dant messages can be sent across these channels in par-
allel, a technique known as concurrent multipath routing
[46, 37, 21], and used for fault tolerance. The receiver
can then use the redundant messages to detect and/or
correct errors. We formally evaluate the effects of net-
work structure on attack-tolerance and show that the
probability of an undetected error decreases exponen-
tially with the number of independent paths between
source and destination, even when no individual path is
entirely trusted.
We also propose a novel concurrent multipath rout-
ing algorithm for the butterfly topology. The algo-
rithm constructs independent paths, which can be com-
bined with the fault-tolerant concurrent multipath rout-
ing scheme above to achieve a high level of adversarial
fault tolerance on the butterfly topology.
Our main contributions are:
• We propose a novel method for extending standard
fault tolerance techniques to adversarial faults in
complex networks. We do so by modeling redun-
dant independent paths with partial trust transi-
tivity as a single virtual channel, and show that
the probability of detecting adversarial faults ap-
proaches 1 exponentially with the number of paths;
• We prove that the number of independent paths
between two nodes in a wrap-around butterfly net-
work with partial trust transitivity increases expo-
nentially with the trust radius;
• We present a scalable, efficient, and attack-tolerant
concurrent multipath routing algorithm on the but-
terfly network topology.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
background and related work. Section 3 describes ad-
versarial fault tolerance on structured networks. Section
4 describes the concurrent multipath routing algorithm
for the butterfly network topology Section 5 discusses
the results. And Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Related Work
There has been considerable work on trust in network
security. Both centralized and decentralized approaches
are commonly used to create trust infrastructures. Cen-
tralized approaches such as public key infrastructure
(PKI) suffer from a number of vulnerabilities [14], which
stem largely from the single points of failure inherent to
centralization. The well-known and widely-used web of
trust approach [45, 16] is a decentralized alternative.
In a web of trust, individuals choose who they trust
initially. Trust is then extended to new individuals if
they are vouched for by a currently-trusted individual,
making it possible to quickly establish a large group of
trusted nodes. However, web of trust’s assumption of
infinite transitivity is unrealistic [10], and does not dis-
tinguish between paths of different lengths. Our work
addresses both of these limitations by incorporating a
more realistic assumption of partial transitivity.
Previous work on incorporating network structure
into trust models has focused on authentication pro-
tocols, showing that independent paths can reduce an
adversary’s ability to impersonate a target [28]. Other
work has shown that identifying independent paths in
arbitrary networks is NP-hard and provided approxima-
tion algorithms [38]. Our work complements these by
introducing the partial trust assumption extending the
focus beyond authentication. When network topology
can be controlled, we sidestep the NP-hard problem of
finding independent paths on arbitrary networks by us-
ing the mathematical structure of the butterfly topology
to construct provably independent paths.
Many distributed consensus protocols (such as those
used by cryptocurrencies) are designed to tolerate arbi-
trary or adversarial faults. Byzantine agreement proto-
cols [27, 8] provide tolerance against arbitrary faults (in-
cluding attacks) under some circumstances, but are lim-
ited to small networks due to poor scalability. Proof-of-
work [13, 34] and proof-of-stake [22] provide better scal-
ability, but are wasteful of computational and energy re-
sources. Federated Byzantine Agreement (FBA) [32] is
scalable, allows for flexible trust, and is highly fault-
tolerant on networks meeting a set of requirements.
However, FBA does not provide a method for evaluating
the fault tolerance properties of different network struc-
tures or for calculating the failure probabilities within
a particular network.
There are relatively few attack-tolerance schemes
that focus on network structure, compared to more
popular cryptographic approaches [16]. All existing
attack-tolerant networks we are aware of are content-
addressable networks: data is routed to and from stor-
age nodes rather than between sender and receiver. Fiat
and Saia described a scheme that combines the butter-
fly topology with expander graphs to create a highly
censorship-resistant, content-addressable network [17],
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although this scheme does not scale well and is imprac-
tical due to a high level of data replication. Perhaps the
most mature structural solution is the Freenet collabo-
ration [11]. Freenet uses secret sharing [39, 7] and small-
world routing [44, 23] to create a content-addressable
network with a high level of both confidentiality and
censorship resistance. Freenet guarantees that data is
stored redundantly, but still allows for centralized net-
work structure, and thus single points of failure, as data
travels from its origin to the redundant storage loca-
tions. Unlike the above content-addressable networks,
our proposal is purely network based and does not re-
quire nodes to store data indefinitely. Our proposal also
improves on the scalablity of Fiat and Saia’s work, and
does not rely on assumptions about existing social net-
work structure.
Multipath routing protocols identify multiple paths
between source and destination in contrast to tradi-
tional unipath routing, which uses a single path. The
special case of concurrent multipath routing uses mutli-
ple paths simultaneously. Multipath routing has many
applications, including reduced congestion, increased
throughput, and more reliability [37]. Many of these
routing protocols offer increased confidentiality [46].
Some approaches utilize redundant paths as backups for
increased fault tolerance [2], and some specifically pro-
tect against adversarial faults [24, 20, 30]. Most work
on multipath routing has been motivated by applica-
tions related to wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and
have thus focused on ad hoc, unstructured networks,
often having a central base station. The method of
Liu et al. [29] routes multiple messages first to ran-
dom peers and then to a central base station, with the
network edges constrained by sensors’ physical location.
We have found only few examples in the existing litera-
ture of applications of concurrent multipath routing to
adversarial fault tolerance, and all have focused on ad-
hoc wireless sensor networks, without attention to the
role of network structure. The alogorithm we present
for the butterfly topology complements existing work
by addressing cases where links are not constrained by
physical distance, and where network structure can be
engineered for greater attack-tolerance.
Our proposed routing algorithm makes use of a struc-
tured network, in which link structure is predetermined.
Structured networks have been a popular tool in par-
allel processing architectures [26]. More recently, peer-
to-peer systems based on distributed hash tables have
used structured overlay networks to map table keys to
local TCP/IP routes [31, 25]. Such networks can be
designed to have favorable structural and routing prop-
erties, which can be used to to improve attack-tolerance.
3 Trust Networks and Fault Tol-
erance
Within the field of fault tolerance, many techniques have
been developed for building reliable systems out of unre-
liable components [3, 41]. We will make use of standard
fault tolerance terminology, summarized here. A fault
is said to occur when one component of a system be-
haves incorrectly (e.g., a routing node blocks or alters a
message). The result of that fault (e.g., a recipient re-
ceiving conflicting messages) is called an error state. If
the error is undetected or corrected to the wrong value,
the system is said to have experienced a failure (e.g.,
an altered message is accepted as authentic). Note that
when an error is detected but cannot be corrected, the
system has still tolerated the fault because it has not
accepted an error state. We are concerned in particular
with adversarial faults, which are chosen strategically
to maximize the likelihood of a failure.
3.1 Partial Trust Model
A central question in large-scale, secure communica-
tion is this: how can two parties communicate reli-
ably and securely when no direct trusted link exists be-
tween them? The commonly-used web of trust approach
[45, 16] extends trust infinitely transitively: to friends
of friends, and friends of friends of friends, and so on.
However, the assumption of infinitely transitive trust is
unrealistic [10], and does not allow for the analysis of
the effects of network structure.
An alternative assumption might be that each hop
away from Alice in in the network reduces the proba-
bility that a node can resist compromise exponentially.
Such a situation could occur if nodes more distant from
Alice are more favorably disposed to Alice’s adversary,
more likely to cooperate with that adversary, or less
likely to take proactive security measures against that
adversary. The above model can be further approxi-
mated by assuming that nodes up to some fixed number
of hops cannot be compromised, and that those beyond
can. This simplified version is still more realistic than
infinite transitivity and will be convenient for proving
our results. We now proceed to define our model for-
mally.
We define the partial trust model on an undirected
graph G = (V,E), although the model can easily be
extended to directed multigraphs. Vertices represent-
ing commiunicating agents, and with edges representing
mutually trusted communication links. Let v ∈ V be an
arbitrary sender (Alice) and w ∈ V be an arbitrary re-
ceiver (Bob). We assume the presence of an adversary
(Mal) who knows the full structure of the network, and
who can compromise a fixed number of nodes, gaining
complete control of their behavior. We also assume that
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Mal is an adversary of Alice and/or Bob specifically,
rather than the network as a whole. So Mal can com-
promise any node except for those trusted by Alice or
Bob. We define a trust radius h such that nodes u and
u′ trust each other if their distance is less than h. For a
given node u, we call the set of trusted nodes its trusted
neighborhood Th(u), and all nodes at exactly distance h
the trust boundary Bh(u):
Th(u) = {u′ | d(u, u′) < h} (1)
Bh(u) = {u′ | d(u, u′) = h} . (2)
The trust boundary Bh plays an important role be-
cause these nodes are not trusted by u, and if compro-
mised can entirely isolate u from the rest of the network.
These trust assumptions imply that when Alice sends a
message to Bob, Mal can only cause faults in the set
of nodes outside both of their trusted neighborhoods:
V \ (Th(v) ∪ Th(w)). We refer to this set of nodes as the
untrusted region.
3.2 Effective Redundancy
Our goal is to achieve fault tolerance through redun-
dancy. In the network setting, redundnacy is achieved
using independent paths [38], which have no common
points of failure. Typically, it is assumed that paths
must be disjoint in order to be independent. However,
under the partial trust assumption, two non-disjoint
paths can still be independent as long as their intersec-
tion contains only trusted nodes, greatly increasing the
level of redundancy available. Under the partial trust
assumption, the available redundancy thus depends on
both the network structure and the level of trust.
We now quantify the effective redundancy between Al-
ice and Bob when trust radius h is assumed. This quan-
tity, δv,w,h is exactly the max-flow/min-cut of the graph
after Alice’s and Bob’s trusted neighborhoods have been
collapsed into single source/sink vertices. Each trust
boundary forms a cut of the network and places an up-
per bound on the min-cut:
δv,w,h ≤ min (| Bh(v) |, | Bh(w) |) . (3)
Equality holds when there are no bottlenecks within
the untrusted region, an indication that the network
is decentralized. The efrective redundancy of the en-
tire graph can be characterized by the minimum over
all vertex pairs:
δh(G) ≡ min
v,w∈V
δv,w,h. (4)
Thus, for any pair of nodes in the network, at least δh
independent, redundant paths can be constructed be-
tween them. δh is a purely structural network property,
and places an upper bound on the effectiveness of any
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Figure 1: Illustration of a trusted communication net-
work and the network properties used by the partial
trust model. Edges represent mutually trusted commu-
nication links. The sender (Alice, v) and receiver (Bob,
w) trust all nodes less than the trust radius h hops away.
These nodes form their trusted neighborhoods Th(v) and
Th(w). We assume that all faults occur in the remain-
ing nodes: the untrusted region. The untrusted nodes
in contact with the trusted neighborhoods for the trust
boundaries Bh(v) and Bh(w), which (in the absence of
central bottlenecks) determine the effective redundancy
δh provided by the network. Alice and Bob can be mod-
elled as connected by a direct link with at least δh re-
dundant channels.
redundancy-based fault tolerance scheme. The more
quickly δh grows with h, the better a network is at lever-
aging trust transitivity to create redundancy. Thus, the
scaling of δh can be used to quantify a network’s abil-
ity to withstand targeted attacks, even when the exact
trust radius h is unknown.
3.3 Multipath Fault Tolerance
Once we have determined a network’s effective redun-
dancy, we can apply redundancy-based fault tolerance
techniques, by sending multiple copies of a message
(concurrent multipath routing). Having found the ef-
fective redundancy between two nodes, we can simplify
our model, replacing independent paths through the
complex network with direct channels between the end-
points. We model our sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob)
as communicating over δh direct and redundant virtual
channels. The partial trust model allows us to make this
simplifying assumption for analyzing a fault tolerance
scheme, but implementing such a scheme will require
a method for constructing specific network paths. We
will return to the question of constructing paths in the
next section. For now, we concern ourselves with the
question: given that the network provides δh redundant
channels between Alice and Bob, what is the probabil-
ity that an adversary (Mal) causes an undetectable error
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after inducing a fixed number of faults?
Let us first consider the scenario in which Alice sends
a message copy over each available channel. We can also
assume that each message includes the number of mes-
sages sent, the full list of channels used, etc., making
that information available to Bob. When Bob receives
the messages, there are several possibilities. If some of
the messages are missing or if some of the messages dis-
agree, Bob knows that some of the messages were either
blocked or altered, and he has successfully tolerated the
fault(s). Bob can then take any of several actions: 1.
request retransmission; 2. end receipts so Alice knows
which paths have been compromised; or 3. attempt er-
ror correction using majority voting. If instead, Bob
finds that all the messages are present and agree, there
are two possible cases. The first case is that Mal has not
compromised any of the messages, and Bob has correctly
accepted them, so no failure has occurred. The second
case is that Mal has compromised all of the messages,
so Bob has accepted an erroneous message and a failure
has occurred. In the present scenario, whether a failure
occurs depends only on whether Mal has the resources
to compromise all of the channels. In a more realistic
scenario, both Alice and Mal have limited resources and
are not able to use or compromise all available channels.
In a more sophisticated multipath fault tolerance
scheme, Alice randomly chooses k ≤ δh channels and
sends a copy of her message on each. We assume
that Mal is capable of compromising l ≤ δh channels.
Since Alice chooses channels randomly, all channels are
equally likely to contain a message, so Mal can do no
better than also choosing randomly. We can also return
to the full network setting by noting that each of the
δh independent paths in the network can serve as inde-
pendent channels between Alice and Bob. Mal’s best
strategy is now to identify a minimum node cut in the
network and randomly compromise nodes from that cut.
With this strategy, each compromised node reduces ef-
fective redundancy by one, equivalent to compromising
one of the channels between Alice and Bob. If k > l, at
least one message will get through uncompromised and
all errors are detectable. Otherwise, the probability of
Mal producing an undetectable error is the probability
that all of Alice’s chosen channels are compromised:
pf =
l!(δh − k)!
δh!(l − k)! . (5)
Letting k = αδh and l = βδh, then applying Stirling’s
approximation gives:
pf ≈
√
β(1− α)√
β − α
[(
β − α
1− α
)α(
β
β − α
)β
(1− α)
]δh
.(6)
Figure 2 shows the value of pf as a function of k
and l. Equation (6) shows that while pf depends on
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Figure 2: The probability of an undetectable error
as a function of the number of message copies and the
number of adversarial faults.
the fractions of redundant paths actually utilized α and
compromised β, it decreases exponentially with the ef-
fective redundancy δh (which we will later see increases
exponentially in h in the butterfly topology). This re-
sult is significant because δh depends only on the net-
work structure and the strength of trust transitivity.
Thus, the scheme can be effective, even when the num-
ber of copies sent k is a small fraction of the effective
redundancy. In other words, this scheme exhibits a sta-
bilizing asymmetry: senders can tolerate attacks from
significantly more powerful adversaries, as long as the
network structure provides large δh.
In order to derive the above results, we have assumed
that Alice and all intermediary agents are able to iden-
tify specific, independent network paths that achieve the
effective redundancy δh. We now proceed to describe a
routing algorithm for doing so in the special case of the
butterfly network topology.
4 Multipath Butterfly Routing
In previous sections, we showed that reliable communi-
cation across a network can be achieved even when any
single message path might be compromised by an ad-
versary, provided the network has sufficient redundancy,
and provided the sender and intermediaries know how
to route message copies along independent paths. In
this section, we address both requirements by proposing
a novel routing algorithm for constructing independent
paths on the butterfly network topology. This architec-
ture and routing algorithm achieve an effective redun-
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dancy that increases exponentially with the trust radius,
allowing a very high level of adversarial fault tolerance.
The structure of the butterfly network is highly con-
strained, making it most suitable for applications where
portions of the network structure can be designed or dic-
tated. Examples of such networks include: overlay net-
works [31, 25], formal organizations [33], government-
regulated cellular networks [42], and call tree notifica-
tion systems [35]. However, when attack-tolerance is
desired, it will always require control over network struc-
ture in order to eliminate single points of failure. The
regular structure of the butterfly is not a limitation of
our approach, but rather a reflection of the inherent dif-
ficulty of attack-tolerance. Lastly, we note that the par-
tial trust model and multipath fault tolerance schemes
of the previous section do not rely on any particular
network topology or routing algorithm, and our choice
of the butterfly topology is only one of many possible
choices.
4.1 Butterfly Network Topology
We choose the butterfly topology [26] because of sev-
eral desirable properties (described below) and because
its structure allows for relatively straightforward design
and analysis of routing algorithms. While several vari-
ations on the butterfly network exist, we utilize the
wrap-around butterfly. We denote the m-dimensional,
directed wrap-around butterfly as a graph wBF(m):
wBF(m) = (V,E↓ ∪ E→) (7)
V = Zm × Zm2 (8)
E↓ = {((l, z), (l + 1 (mod m), z)} (9)
E→ = {(l, z), (l + 1 (mod m), z ⊕ 1l}, (10)
where Zm is the set of integers modulo m, ⊕ represents
componentwise addition modulo 2, and 1l is a vector
with a 1 in index l and 0 elsewhere. Each node is asso-
ciated with a level l and an m-bit string z known as the
place-within-level. There are two types of edges: down,
and down-right (shown in Figure 3). Down edges (E↓)
connect nodes sharing the same z value in a cycle of
increasing level l. Down-right edges (E→) also link to a
node of level l+1, but one having the place-within-level
equal to z with the lth bit inverted.
The wrap-around butterfly network is known to have
several of the properties we desire for scalable, decen-
tralized communication networks:
Vertex-transitivity: Because the wrap-around but-
terfly is vertex transitive, it is maximally decen-
tralized;
Small-diameter: For any two nodes, the length of the
shortest path between them is O(logN), where N
is the number of nodes in the network;
Figure 3: Schematic illustration of the two types of
edges in a directed butterfly network. The node (l, z) is
shown as the bit string z with a square around the lth
bit. “Down” edges increment l, leaving z unchanged,
while “down-right” edges increment l and invert the
lth bit of z. In the wrap-around variant, the nodes
with maximum l have down and down-right edges to
the nodes with l = 0.
Sparsity: With a constant degree of 4, the wrap-
around butterfly is extremely sparse, and can scale
indefinitely without node degree becoming a limi-
tation;
Redundancy: Multiple paths exist between any two
nodes. Specifically, we will prove below that the
number of independent paths between two nodes
increases exponentially with the trust radius h.
The structure of the butterfly network lends itself to a
well-known (unipath) routing algorithm, which we later
extend to the multipath case. The unipath algorithm
first follows a down or down-right edge at every step, in-
creasing the level l by 1 and cycling through the indices
of the place-within-level. If the current node’s place-
within-level matches the destination node’s at index l, a
down edge is chosen and the place-within-level does not
change. Otherwise, a down-right edge is chosen and the
lth component of the place-within-level is flipped, after
which it matches the destination. After m iterations of
this, all levels have been visited and the place-within-
level matches that of the destination. Simply following
down (or up) edges will then increment (decrement) the
level until the destination node is reached.
4.2 Multipath Routing Algorithm
We now present a routing algorithm to construct 2h in-
dependent paths between two nodes in a butterfly net-
work, where h is the trust radius under the partial trust
model. Informally, Alice sends each message to a dis-
tinct node on her trust boundary, then to a distinct
intermediate node in the untrusted region, then to a
distinct node on Bob’s trust boundary, and finally to
Bob. The intermediate nodes are in a sense “far” from
each other and ensure that no two paths overlap in the
untrusted region. Each path can be parameterized by a
single integer s, which identifies the specific node on Al-
ice’s trust boundary (or equivalentely the node on Bob’s
trust boundary, or the untrusted intermdiate).
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The algorithm guarantees paths are independent by
ensuring that (outside the trusted neighborhoods) they
only include nodes that match the path parameter s at
certain indexes in their place-within-level. Since each
path has a unique parameter s, its set of untrusted nodes
is disjoint from all other paths. As with the unipath
routing algorithm, each of the multiple paths proceed
from a source v to a destination u using down and down-
right edges, cycling through levels one at a time. How-
ever, we cycle through the levels twice, once to route
from v to a particular path’s intermediary node, and
again to route from the intermediary to w. Each cycle
is divided into stages, with different properties used to
prove independence at each stage (see Figure 4). In the
first cycle (stages 1–4), path independence is guaranteed
by ensuring that all nodes match the path parameter s
in the first h bits of the place-within-level. Similarly, in
the second cycle (stages 5–7), independence is guaran-
teed by ensuring that all paths match s in the h bits of
the place-within-level preceding the destination index.
A full example is illustrated in Figure 5.
4.2.1 Algorithm Specification
We now begin the formal specification of our multipath
routing scheme for the wrap-around butterfly network.
For convenience, the relevant variables are summarized
in Table 1. Utilizing vertex transitivity, we label the
source node as (l(0), z(0)) = (0, 0) and denote the desti-
nation node as w = (lw, zw), without loss of generality.
Let s be an h-bit binary string with si denoting
the bit at index i. There are 2h such strings. Let
v
(t)
s = (l(t), z(t)) be the node at position t in the path
parameterized by s. For convenience, we will omit the
subscript s when it is obvious from context. We define
three distinct partitions of m-bit binary strings. Let
Qv(0) be the set of m-bit strings in which the bits at all
indices h ≤ i < lw−h match those of z(0), and let Qv(0)
be its complement. Note that Qv(0) is trivially all m-bit
strings if lw < 2h. Let Rs be the set of m-bit strings
with the lowest h bits all matching the bits of s, and
let Rs be its complement. Let Ss be the set of m-bit
strings with the h bits preceding index lw all matching
the bits of s˜, where s˜ is a cyclic permutation of s:
s˜i = s(i+lw) mod h, (11)
and let Ss be its complement. We will make use of the
fact that:
s 6= s′ =⇒ Ss ∩ Ss′ = Rs ∩Rs′ = ∅. (12)
Routes are constructed in 7 stages. The network
topology dictates that l(t+1) = l(t) + 1 (mod m), so
we let l = t (mod m). and that z(t+1) is equal to z(t)
with or without the bit in index l(t) inverted, depending
on whether the down or down-right edge was taken at
step t.
0. . . . . . 0. . . . . . 0. . . . . . 0
h lw − 2h h m− lw
start
A B C D
s . . . 0. . . . . . 0. . . . . . 01.
s . . . 1. . . . . . 0. . . . . . 02.
s . . . 1. . . s˜ . . . 03.
s . . . 1. . . s˜ zw,D4.
zw,A . . . 1. . . s˜ zw,D5.
zw,A zw,B s˜ zw,D6.
zw,A zw,B zw,C zw,D7.
Figure 4: Progression of place-within-level z as the
multipath routing algorithm cycles through the levels
of the butterfly network.
Figure 5: An example of one path as constructed by
the proposed multipath routing algorithm. The path is
shown for s = 102 and w = (6, 01101112).
Table 1: Butterfly Multipath Routing Variables
NAME VARIABLE
butterfly dimension m ∈ Z+
node level l ∈ Z : 0 ≤ l < m
node place within level z ∈ Zm2
trust radius h ∈ Z : 1 ≤ h ≤ bm/2c
path index s ∈ Zh2
Stage 1: (0 ≤ t < h) Down or down-right edges are
chosen such that the tth bit of z(t+1) is equal
to the tth bit of s. Throughout Stage 1, all
nodes are within the sender’s trusted neighbor-
hood. Throughout Stage 1, z(t) ∈ Qv(0) . At the
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end of Stage 1, z(h) ∈ Ss, and z(t) will remain so
until the level cycles to 0 at t = m.
Stage 2: (h ≤ t < lw − h) Edges are chosen to make
the tth bit of z(t+1) the inverse of the tth bit of z(0).
Note that this stage does not occur when lw < 2h.
If this stage occurs, then z(t) ∈ Qv(0) until these
levels are reached again in stage 6.
Stage 3: (lw − h ≤ t < lw) The bits of z(t) are chosen
to match s˜, such that after the stage is complete,
z(t) ∈ Rs.
Stage 4: (lw ≤ t < m) Paths are chosen such that the
tth bit of z(t+1) matches that of the destination
node zw. This stage will not occur if lw > m− h.
Stage 5: (m ≤ t < m+ h) There are two cases. If
2h < lw < m− h, then there is no overlap between
the indices defining Rs and Ss. In this case, the
first h bits of z(t) are set to match zw. Otherwise
there is some overlap between the indices defining
Rs and Ss. In this case, the each of the first h bits
of z(t) is either kept the same if lw − h ≤ l < lw,
or set to the corresponding bit of zw otherwise. In
this stage and after, z(t) is no longer guaranteed to
be in Rs. However, z
(t) remains in Ss during and
after this stage.
Stage 6: (m+ h ≤ t < m+ lw − h) In this stage,
edges are chosen to set the bits of z(t) to their
corresponding value in zw. z
(t) ∈ Qv(0) throughout
this stage, but not afterwards.
Stage 7: (m+ lw − h ≤ t < m+ lw) The h bits of z(t)
preceding index lw are set to match zw. All nodes
in this stage are within h hops of w and thus in its
trusted neighborhood. After this stage, v(m+lw) =
w and routing is complete.
4.2.2 Proof of Path Independence
Theorem 1. Given an m-bit wrap-around butterfly net-
work (m > 1), and a radius h (1 ≤ h ≤ ⌊m2 ⌋), for
all node pairs (v, w) such that d(v, w) ≥ 2h, there ex-
ist 2h paths vs (0 ≤ s < 2h) from v to w such that
s 6= s′ =⇒ vs ∩ vs′ ⊂ Th(u) ∪ Th(v).
Proof. Nodes from two paths can only coincide if their
levels are the same. Nodes which share a level must
either be in the same stage, or 4 stages apart. Let
(a,a′) denote a pair of sub-paths corresponding to stage
a of one path and stage a′ of another. Excluding paths
that intersect in their trusted neighborhoods, (1,1) and
(7,7), we have reduced the list of possible intersections
to the following cases: (2,2), (3,3), (4,4), (5,5), (6,6),
(1,5), (2,6), and (3,7). Nodes in stages 2–4 belong to
Rs so cannot overlap with any stage 2–4 nodes from an-
other path, eliminating (2,2), (3,3), and (4,4). Similarly,
nodes in stages 4–6 belong to a unique Ss, eliminating
(5,5) and (6,6). Nodes in stage 1 belong to Qv(0) while
those in stage 5 belong in its complement, eliminating
(1,5). Similarly, for all l in stage 2, z(l) is equal to z(0),
while in stage 6, z(l) is the inverse, eliminating (2,6)
This leaves only (3,7), a collision which can occur only
for only one path (with s matching the first h bits of zw),
and which enters the trusted neighborhood in stage 3.
For this single path, we can proceed directly from stage
2 to stage 7, eliminating the last possible collision.
Thus, assuming the partial trust model with trust
transitive for h hops, we can construct 2h paths on a
wrap-around butterfly topology which do not intersect
outside the trusted neighborhoods of the source and des-
tination. Note that the node sequence v
(t)
s can be cal-
culated entirely from the source v, destination w, and
path parameter s, meaning that with this information
nodes are able to determine which neighbor to route a
given message copy to. Furthermore, the existence of 2h
paths places a lower bound on the effective redundancy
δh, showing that the decentralized, redundant, struc-
tured networks such as the butterfly can have a very
low probability of failure when faced with adversarial
faults, even from a very powerful attacker.
5 Discussion
While decentralized protocols have received much at-
tention for their potential fault tolerance applications,
centralized structures are always vulnerable to exploita-
tion by non-technical means (i.e., coercion), and there
is a need for a better understanding of the relation-
ship between network structure and attack-tolerance.
We have proposed a network-based scheme for adversar-
ial fault tolerance on the butterfly topology, utilizing a
novel concurrent multipath routing algorithm. We have
also demonstrated how partial trust transitivity, in ad-
dition to being more realistic than infinite transitivity,
provides a theoretical foundation for quantitative analy-
sis of the relationship between trust, network structure,
and attack tolerance.
Such attacks include many forms of censorship and
surveillance, which have important social implications.
We have already discussed two such cases: Pakistan’s
inadvertant censorship of YouTube [19] and the FBI’s
surveillance-turned-censorship of Lavabit [36]. The
reader may wonder how our methods could be employed
in scenarios such as large-scale state-sponsored censor-
ship. Censorship-resistant infrastructure often replaces
central servers (e.g., the router in the 2008 YouTube
incident) with multiple servers across the world, syn-
chronized through consensus protocols. The directory
authorities used by the Tor project [12] are one ex-
ample. However, the size of such authority networks
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is often limited by the number of trusted relationships
(degree) each node can maintain, and the inherent in-
security of extending transitive trust to an ever-larger
network. Our work fills a much-needed gap by quan-
tifying the connection between network-structure, trust
transitivity, and attack-tolerance. We provide both a
theoretical framework and specific example of how net-
work structure can be engineered to leverage trust for a
high level of attack-tolerance, without sacrificing scala-
bility.
Fault-tolerant network infrastructures have many di-
rect applications. Areas such as cryptocurrency [32, 34,
22], secure multiparty computation [43, 9, 18], and wire-
less sensor networks [21] have immediate need for scal-
able, fault-tolerant infrastructures. Many Internet ser-
vices (e.g., email, social networks, cloud storage) are still
highly centralized and vulnerable to technical and non-
technical (i.e., coercive) attacks. Fault tolerance using
both decentralized protocols and decentralized network
structures is one promising approach to securing these
services.
We have focused primarily on adversarial faults that
block or change messages (e.g., censorship). Existing
cryptographic techniques for circumventing surveillance
are relatively mature compared to those for tolerat-
ing censorship. However, the techniques presented in
this paper are entirely compatible with, and in some
cases could enhance, existing anti-surveillance tech-
niques. For example, man-in-the-middle attacks exploit
a privileged network position to attack otherwise secure
cryptography, suggesting that structural approaches can
complement cryptographic ones.
While our present proposal is specific to the butterfly
topology, the multipath fault tolerance scheme could be
applied to any network that has both sufficient redun-
dancy and a routing algorithm to discover independent
paths. For general networks, finding all such paths is
NP-hard, but efficient, suboptimal algorithms exist [38].
However, we have argued that attack-tolerance requires
the ability to influence network structure and reduce
reilance on single points of failure. Our work is most
applicable to cases where the need for attack-tolerance
justifies investment in deliberate infrastructure. For ex-
ample, a coalition of groups supporting free expression
could use our work to construct a censorship-resistant
communication network. In general, such groups would
need to invest resources into vetting their neighbors to
establish trust, but there are scenarios in which the
attack-tolerance requirement would justify that invest-
ment. It is also worth noting that because faulty paths
can be identified in our scheme, it may at times be ap-
propriate to begin by assuming mutual trust and revok-
ing that relationship if it is violated. Any entities de-
pendent on the proper functioning of the network would
have an incentive to resist attack in order to maintain
their ability to participate.
Our work suggests several directions for future work
towards developing practical, attack-tolerant communi-
cation infrastructure. The development of new multi-
path routing algorithms on other structured networks
could achieve higher levels of redundancy. It is also
desirable to identify dynamics that give rise to struc-
tured networks, and to evaluate whether our results
can be generalized to unstructured or approximately
structured networks. Finally, these results could be im-
plemented to address specific applications, e.g., secure
messaging, domain name resolution, or anonymous web
browsing.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a novel concurrent multipath routing
algorithm for the butterfly topology, as well as a scheme
for using this algorithm to construct a highly attack-
tolerant virtual channel between any two nodes, even
when no fully-trusted path exists between them. Under
this scheme, the probability of an adversary causing an
undetectable error decreases exponentially with the net-
work’s effective redundancy. The effective redundancy,
in the case of the butterfly topology, grows exponentially
with the trust radius. Furthermore, a small increase in
the number of messages sent can compensate for a large
increase in the number of messages compromised by an
adversary. We have also demonstrated how the assump-
tion of partial trust transitivity can enable a quantita-
tive analysis of the relationships between network struc-
ture, trust, and attack-tolerance. These results are di-
rectly applicable to systems in which the link structure
can be imposed by the designer, and more generally,
provide a theoretical foudnation that can be used more
to evaluate the role of network structure, trust transi-
tivity, and effective redundancy on attack-tolerance.
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